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Can Virtue Be Taught? 
Glenn Rawson 
One of Plato's liveli est Socratic dialogues, the Protagoras, stages a debate 
between the greatest philosopher and the greatest sophist of their time, 
with other lea ding sophists in the audience. The debate concerns Pro -
tagoras' own specialty: the t eaching of 'virtue ' or arete, a crucial term in 
ancient Greece that involves both moral goodness and human greatness. 
Protagoras and Socrates end up with oddly overlapping intellectual posi-
tions: Socrates contends that virtue is not something that's taught, though 
he believes that all of virtue is essentially a kind of knowledge. Protagora s 
denies that all virtues are forms of knowledge, though he maintains that 
they are in fact commonly taught, and taught especially well by himself . 
Thi s historical fiction was composed some forty or fifty years after its 
dramatic setting, but its colourful and inconclusive portraits are probably 
roughly correct. (Most scholars consider Protagoras' main speech there 
a paraphrase or imitation of his original writings, which have not 
survived.) Thes e men were debating in new ways what was already an 
ancient theme. But since sophists won their fame and wealth through 
public speeches and private courses on matters social and ethical, and 
sinc e these new professionals were often suspected as charlatans, old 
questions about virtue and teaching were a persistent element in the 
sophists' env ironm ent. 
The sophists and Socrates gave new life to such traditional subjects 
with their especia lly intellectual approaches. Their innovative verbal arts 
included the beginning s of grammar, rhetoric and logic, and though the 
sophists were not generally interested in Socrates ' attempts to defin e 
virtues, the best of them used their new kinds of speeches and reasoning 
to explai n and advocate traditional virtues in a spirit of reform and 
progress. In spite of some important disagreements , Socrates and the 
major sophists were all elaborating traditional Greek themes about hu-
man natur e and society, justice and happiness. Broadly they agreed that 
success ful communities and lives require civic virtues like justice and 
moderation; that cultivating those virtues requires some kind of moral 
educat ion ; and that moral education requires natural talents and practical 
training in addition to verbal instruction. Their own contributions con-
cerni ng virtue were basicall y intellectual and theoretical , no matter how 
much their theories might emphasise the role of practical training. The 
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same is true of later philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, who were 
after all much influenced by these sophists. 
Ancient ideals of virtue and justice 
When Socrates asks Protagoras what he offers prospective students, 
Protagoras replies that he can make them better each day , and better not 
in some technical skill or specialised subject but in a quite general human 
virtue: 
my subject is good judgment [euboulia]: in private matters, so he may best 
manage his own household , and in public matters, so he may be most capable 
in the city's affairs, both in action and in speech (Protagora s 318e-19a) . 
This bold promise of success in human activity generally , of private and 
public excellence in word and deed, is Protagoras' professional formulation 
of the traditional ideal of arete. Ever since the earliest Greek literature , 
arete is a central ideal and basic motivator , embracing goodness and 
greatness, as an excellent human being and as an outstanding memb er of 
a human community. Protagoras calls his version the art of the citizen 
(319a), political virtue (322e, 324a), and man's virtue (325a). His promise 
about being 'most capable in the city's affairs, both in action and in speech' 
attracts the ambitions of wealthy young men to win power and honour in 
Greek politics, with effective public speaking in law courts and assemblies. 
It is the fifth-century political descendent of the arete pursued so memo-
rably by the epic heroes - such as Achilles and Odysseus in Hom er's Iliad 
and Odyssey - who were literally cult figures in their hometowns as well 
as cultural icons throughout Greece. Homer was composing three centu-
ries before Protagoras , working his poetic art and moral vision on stories 
that were much older still. His heroes strive for greatness, and constantly 
compete for honour , not only in the deeds of war and sport but also in 
persuasive and appropriate speech. Odysseus was especially recognised 
for his speaking abilities, and even the greatest warrior Achill es, who was 
enjoined by hi s father 
always be excellent , and be superior to others (Iliad XI. 784) 
was trained for that purpose by his personal mentor Pho enix 
to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds (Iliad IX.443). 
These slogans express an ideal of aristocratic education in the centuries 
leading to our sophists: to win honour and power through arete, the manly 
virtues of courage, strength and skill, both in action and in speech. Such 
competitive virtues were thought to constitute greatness in a man, th e 
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way that beauty and fidelity were the virtues of his wife, speed the virtue 
of his horses, and fertility the virtue of his land. 
But sophists also drew from another deep current in Greek culture, 
which prized modest good sense or self-restraint (s6phrosune) and justice 
(dikaiosune). Hesiod, who was second only to Homer in antiquity and 
authority, made justice and humble hard work the theme of his Works and 
Days. He describes a former Golden Age without competition for honour 
or any other kind of strife; for his own bleak times, he values only that 
competition which inspires honest toil to earn a good living. His Theogony 
ranks Justice (Dike) as a goddess, daughter of Zeus and divine Right Rule 
(Themis). In Hesiod's vision , Zeus rewards justice with peace and prosper-
ity, and justice even distinguishes humans from mere animals (Works and 
Days 274ff.): 
Dear Perses, take this to your heart: 
listen to justice and forget all violence. 
That's the lawful way of life that Zeus assig ned for men. 
Fish and beasts and birds of the air may eat 
each other; among them is no justice. 
But human s he gave justi ce, which proves to be much better. 
Homer's honour-loving heroes do not identify justice and self-restraint as 
part of their virtue or arete; but on the whole Homer shares Hesiod's love 
of these more cooperative virtues. While the Iliad and Odyssey worked 
their ethical legacy largely through glorious episodes of honour-seeking 
competition, their plots as wholes celebrate something different: Achilles' 
friendship with Patroclus and his return to civilised compassion, Odys-
seus' enduring heart of reverence and the harmony of spirit he shares with 
his wife. Homer even agrees that justice suits human nature: when 
Achilles predicts his great outrages against Hector, he calls himself a lion 
and a wolfrather than a man (XXII.250-67, 337-54); and Odyss eus' brutish 
enemy the Cyclops is less than human because he lacks law and justic e 
(themis, IX.105-15). 
The combination of these two ideals, harmonious justic e and competi-
tive manly arete, shaped Greek et hics and politics for centuries. 
Generations of poets and philosophers gradually internalised both arete 
and justice as matters of mind and character (psyche) , rather than merely 
of actions and material goods. And they gradually incorporated civic 
virtues lik e moderation and justice as part of human virtue or arete itself. 
Most sophists agreed, joining the tradition of the legendary Seven Sages, 
the Delphi c oracle, and many works of Greek th eatre and hi story, which 
constantly warn that wrongh ea ded pur suit of arete leads to hubris - the 
boundary-breaking arrogance and violence that is the opposite of modera-
tion and justic e. 
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Learning virtue: teaching, training, and nature 
Such constant exhortations to virtue testif y to the difficult y of properly 
learning it, and here too the sophists add their voices to an ancient chorus. 
Even the earliest poetry, as it explores and celebrates human virtue, 
acknowledges the necessity and the limits of moral education. In the Iliad, 
when Phoenix reminds Achilles of his training in good words and deeds , 
he is trying to persuade Achilles back to a more honourable, less destruc-
tive path - but Achilles doesn't listen. The Odyssey foregrounds the late 
education of Odysseus' son, whose good nature deplores the hubris of his 
mother's suitors, but fails to produce good leadership in th e absence of a 
good role model. And Hesiod's teachings in the Works and Days are framed 
as corrective lessons to his brother, who has fallen to the point of stealing 
Hesiod's inheritance after wasting his own. Hesiod implores (293ff.): 
Best is the man who sees all for hims elf, 
perceiving what's better in the future and in the end. 
And good is the man who listens to good advice . 
But he who neither sees for himself nor takes to heart 
what he hears from another - that is a useless man. 
So you, Perses, born of good blood, remember what I tell you, 
and work! 
Centuries lat er, the sophists' educational theories face the same challenge 
of combining verbal teaching with natural abilities and personal effort -
but in a different kind of social environment. 
In the generations after Homer and Hesiod , the somewhat feudal 
aristocracies developed into sophisticated governments with civic centres 
and citizens' rights. A kind of people's assembly was typical even in the 
aristocratic 'dark ages,' convene d at the nobl es' discretion to serve their 
own age nda . But as populations and economies grew, assemblies grew in 
size and influence. Groups that had been subjects of the traditional noble 
families earned increasing shares of political power. Laws were written 
down for public view, and participation in real decision-making spread out 
from the nobles to other landholders and to those who earned through 
trade and industry. Some of these independent city-states became demo-
cracies - most notably Athens, where elections and lotteri es and pay for 
public service effectively extended political rights to even the poorest 
citizens (but not to slaves or women) . Any male citizen in Athens could 
serve as councillor and magistrate and judge, and formally address the 
whole asse mbly . Oth er city-states, with broad or narrow oligarchies , had 
greater restrictions on citizenship an d citizens' rights, but often with 
corresponding kinds of assemblies and courts requiring effective public 
speaki ng. This is the social and political background to the professional 
success of the sophists in teaching their verbal arts. While old aristocratic 
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families still often dominated politics (and athletics and priesthoods and 
social prestige generally), now their traditions of winning honour for arete 
were pursued largely through political debate, in arguments about justice 
and good sense no less than in speeches about competitive greatness. 
Many now paid sophists to teach them how to do it effectively. In principle 
that success would be taught to anyone who could afford the classes. 
So in part, debates about whether virtue can be taught were implicitly 
debates about whether the upper classes should have to share political 
power with lower classes. Some denied that virtue was the sort of thing 
that could be taught as sophists taught things: to anyone who can pay their 
fees and succeed in their courses . Even before such travelling teachers 
existed, great poets spoke for the waning aristocracies, lamenting the 
diffusion of traditional privileges among nouveaux riches. When Theognis 
famously pronounced that 
teaching will never make a base man noble (437-8) 
these loaded terms refer at once to moral qualities and social class. And 
Pindar, just before the age of the sophists, proclaimed (Ninth Olympian 
Ode 100-3): 
What comes by nature is always best. 
But many strive for fame with virtues merely taught . 
He too is supporting the aristocratic notion that real virtue comes through 
'nature' by being born into the right families. These poets also praise 
teaching in the sense of personal mentoring and training within the 
privileged group (Theognis 33-6, 69-72; Pindar, Tenth Olympian 16-21). 
But they emphasise inherited nature to preserve that distinction over 
others who have won political and social concessions. By contrast, soph-
ists' claims to teach all customers were seen as continuing the process that 
undermined the old order. It's no accident that they were most successful 
at Athens, in the thoroughly political atmosphere of the radical democracy 
recently established there. 
However, if this new profession of teaching political skill was in princi-
ple progressive, the sophists' expensive courses were in effect exclusive, 
full of the sons of the very wealthy. So in addition to the elitist resistance 
from traditionalists about aristocratic personal mentorship, there was 
popular resentment for perpetuating class privilege by teaching rich boys 
to manipulate crowds with fancy talk. To top it off, other intellectuals like 
Socrates offered their own versions of both kinds of criticisms. So their 
undeniable commercial success and cultural influence was attended by 
disapproval and fear. Underlying it all was a common concern for the 
overwhelming importance of justice and the other virtues about which the 
sophists spoke so powerfully. The social upheavals of the Peloponnesian 
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War highlighted the vulnerability of civic virtues, and if the sophists' 
exclusive clientele suggested a lack of real seriousness about ju stice, their 
intellectual focus suggested disdain for what matters more: training from 
an early age to be a man of good character. But we shall see that vario u s 
leading sophists show genuine inter est in (1) advancing that moral train-
ing through their public addresses and private seminars, and (2) exploring 
all the elements of moral education that were implicit since Homer and 
Hesiod: inherited nature (physis), personal effort and practical training 
(melete, askesis), and verbal teaching (didache). 
Four sophists on the teaching and learning of virtue 
Many classical authors concerned themselves with moral education, in-
cluding playwrights, historians , statesmen and philosophers beyond those 
we call sophists, but most were somehow influenced by sophists. Specific 
debate about whether virtue can be taught is most explicit in just two 
sources: the schematic summaries in the anonymous Dissoi Logoi, and the 
more philosophical representations in Plato 's Protagoras together with 
parts of hi s Meno. But the teachings of many of the sophists implicated 
and affected the teaching of virtue. Here I survey the relevant remains of 
four leading sophists. Protagoras was first and most important , but their 
careers overlapped and interacted. Since Protagoras' influence on later 
philosophers is clearest , I discuss Protagoras last. (I use evidence from 
Plato broadly and cautiously, and especially when it resonate s other 
sources.) 
Gorgias allegedly called hims elf an orator but not a sophist (a point 
highlighted in Plato's Gorgias but ignored in other dialogues). He claims 
to make men powerful speakers while den ying that h e teach es them virtue 
(Meno 95c). Yet Gorgias spoke powerfull y about virtue in public gatherings 
throughout Greece, and his professional displays included answering 
questions about any subject whatever (Gorgias 447c-8a, Meno, 70b-c). He 
taught the same young men who studied virtue with other sophists. So his 
denial of teaching virtue may ha ve been occasional and strategic, perhaps 
a marketing ploy against his commercial rivals. In Plato 's Gorgias, when 
Socrates presses the point that Gorgias teaches men to be persuasive 
about justice and injustice , Gorgias concedes that he will teach them what 
justice is if th ey don 't already know , though h e shouldn't be held respon-
sible for their speec hes and actions (456c-60d) . 
But the real Gorgias may have believed that in a sense virtue cannot be 
taught at all. One of his compositions argued (if partly in fun) that nothing 
really exists, and if something did exist we couldn't know it, and if we could 
know it we couldn't communicate it. About virtue in particular , he would 
'define' it only by enum eration, with different kinds of qualities for differ-
ent kinds of people (Aristotle , Politics 1260a14-28; Plato, Meno 71cff.). So 
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he probably believed that there is no essential truth about virtue to be 
learned as a matter of theory, but he may have believed that students 
become virtuous through the practice of making good speeches about noble 
ideals. That was the professional theory of his influential student 
Isocrates, and a memorial statue at Olympia claimed that 'no man yet has 
found a fairer art than Gorgias, to train the soul for contests of virtue'. 
Although Aristotle reports that Gorgias' students learned by memorising 
and imitating his speeches, the few models that survive are not exhorta-
tions to virtue. 
Gorgias seems to have developed a theory that persuasive speaking 
effects its power independently of truth. He aimed at a new art of prose 
that works like poetry, moving its audience with quasi-metrical rhythm 
and balance, striking metaphors, and rhyme. In this connection, he noted 
that tragedy (important public poetry in Greek life) produces a kind of 
deception 'in which the deceiver is more just than the nondeceiver, and the 
deceived is wiser than the nondeceived' (Plutarch, On the Fame of the 
Athenians 5). Was he thinking only of aesthetic suspension of disbelief, or 
also of possible moral effects? His Encomium of Helen 'demonstrated' 
playfully that since we live by opinion rather than knowledge, speech 
persuades with another form of the same power exercised by physical 
compulsion. In any case , Gorgias was loosely 'teaching virtue' whether he 
admitted it or not - in the tradition of helping young men win honour from 
their peers and others. That was the allure of his promise to make them 
powerful speakers. 
Hippias, in the next generation , pursued a career like that of Gorgias: 
while travelling as ambassador throughout Greece, he gave private classes 
and public displays with open question-and-answer sessions, using the 
kind of florid style that Gorgias introduced. But Hippias also went further. 
He attempted expertise in all arts, theoretical and practical. If Gorgias 
tried to be persuasive about all kinds of subjects without having to 
understand them, Hippias tried to learn all things through wide-ranging 
study and personal experience. Plato portrays him as boastful and over-
confident, but even so his curiosity and talents must have been remark-
able . He performed at public festivals in clothes and shoes and jewellery 
made by himself, and he taught mathematics, astronomy, music, poetry, 
history and genealogy. Among it all , he gave special attention to virtue, 
trying to encourage noble pursuits through inspiring literature. In addi-
tion to writing his own tragedies (Plato, Hippias Minor 368c-d), Hippias 
delivered speeches on ethical themes in traditional poetry. For example , 
he argued that Homer makes Achilles a much better man than Odysseus, 
and he added an episode to the Trojan saga in which Nestor teaches the 
orphaned son of Achilles about honourable activities and noble customs. 
We don't know how good his stories were, as no ancient sources preserve 
or discuss them in any detail. 
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Hippias was among the first to teach a broad antithesis between the 
claims of nature (physis) and those of custom or law (no mos) - and here he 
contributes to a momentous development in ethical debates . Earlier litera-
ture mentions divine and unwritten laws that have priority over human 
conventions, but Hippias alleged some kind of general opposition between 
conventional and natural laws. This kind of antithesis would later be used 
in various ways, sometimes even serving crass hedonistic egoism, as with 
Callicles in Plato's Gorgias. But Hippias represents the more humane 
general trend among sophists, privileging nature over convention to pro-
mote unity among men (at least among intelligent men) and to advocate 
harmonious reconciliation. That is the spirit in which he offers to mediate 
between Socrates and Protagoras in Plato's Protagoras (337d-e). Hippias' 
belief in the justice of universal, unwritten laws is reported by Xenophon 
too (Memorabilia IV.4). His ideal of a natural kinship, immune to artificial 
social boundaries, suggests that his stories about virtuous practices were 
intended as lessons for everyone everywhere. 
Prodicus is often cited for his attention to fine distinctions among related 
terms. Plato parodies him with a speech distinguishing four pairs of 
ethical terms in just a few sentences (Protagoras 337a-c), and suggests 
that his attraction to fine distinctions misses the point of some ethical 
discussions (341e-42a, 358d-e). Yet Plato knew the importance of speaking 
precisely about virtues and vices, and there is something positive in his 
suggestion that some who aren't prepared for Socrates' exercises in defi-
nition should first study with Prodicus (Theaeteus 151b). The great histo-
rian Thucydides, who denounced the opportunistic perversion of ethical 
terms during the Peloponnesian War, was thought to have learned some-
thing from Prodicus (Marcellinus, Life of Thucydides 36; see Sprague, 7 4). 
Prodicus had a striking theory about the origin of religion, in which 
humans first worshipped the parts of nature that were useful in their 
struggle to survive. Some considered this atheistic and corrupting, but 
Prodicus shows his support for social virtues in his rhetorical display on 
'The Choice of Hercules'. He invented this tale, in which Virtue and Vice 
compete for the attention of the young Hercules with opposed speeches 
advocating different paths oflife: one of easy selfish pleasure and apparent 
beauty; the other of hard work and generous service that eventually leads 
to genuine friendship, honour and satisfaction. The rhetorically polished 
original is lost, but the rough paraphrase recorded by Xenophon (Memora-
bilia II.1) is enough to glimpse a heavy-handed lesson for impressionable 
young minds. The theme of the 'Choice', and the focus upon struggle and 
survival in the theory of religion, follow the path of Hesiod's Works and 
Days, emphasising above all the role of hard work in achieving virtue . 
Protagoras (339e-42a) associates Prodicus with poetry by Simonides (c. 
556-c. 468) about how hard it is to become good. That is the main point 
delivered by his Virtue personified, though she begins by noting Hercules ' 
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inherited good nature and she also mentions the need for expert teachers. 
The speech of Virtue itself, like the whole 'Choice of Hercules' debate, has 
its role in moral education as verbal instruction: encouraging precepts and 
reasons in favour of taking the more difficult path. 
Protagoras. We have detected, in the remains of three major sophists, 
various explorations of teaching, training and nature in moral education. 
Now we are prepared to appreciate the work of Protagoras , which influ-
enced all the others. Few direct quotations survive from this versatile 
intellectual pathfinder. He is now mos t famous for two striking claims: 
Man is the measure of all things: the being of what is and the nonbeing of 
what is not1 (Fragment 1; see Plato, Theaetetus 152a, Cratylus 385e; Wat er-
field 2000, 213). 
Concerning the gods I cannot know that they exist or that they do not exist, 
or what form they might have. Much prevents knowing it: its obscurity, and 
the shortness of human life (Fragment 4; Diogenes La ertius IX.52; Dillon 
and Gergel 2003, 21). 
But mor e to the point of our survey, h e argued in a Great Speech that 
teaching requires natural talent and practice ... one mu st start learning 
young (Fragment 3; Waterfield 2000, 219). 
Since the original contexts of all these lines are lost , we confront an 
apparent conflict: general scepticism and relativism about gods and 'all 
things' versus a practical realism about good education. But some scholars 
argue that the 'man-measure doctrine ' need not imply a radical form of 
relativism; it could be about a kind of relative judgments that is compat-
ible with a substantial measure of realism in science and education. (See 
for exa mpl e the treatments by Kerf er d and Woodruff .) In any case, our 
survey must include the debate in Plato's Protagoras , where Protagoras 
argues that real virtue is taught and lea rn ed by everyo ne throughout life 
- an argument that beautifully elaborates the quotation from the Great 
Speech. 2 That argument includes a defence of democratic assemblies, 
which suits Protagoras ' association with the great Athenian democrat 
Pericles, and the fact that he wrote the laws for the democratic , pan-Hel-
len ic settl ement of Thurii. So I accept the main speech in the Protagoras 
as reconstructing Protagoras' own views, and ignore here the less reliable 
evidence in Plato's Theaetetus, which is our earliest source for the relativ-
ism of Fragment 1 above. Anyone interested in classical debates about 
teaching virt ue must study the Protagoras (especially 316b -328c). 
In that dialogue, when Protagoras promises to make his students good 
men and good citizens, Socrates explains why he doubts that virtue is 
taught. He cites two widely experienced facts with powerful implications: 
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on it. While its cultivation requires teaching and training, it is more basic 
and universal than the variable customs of different societies. 'It is neces-
sary that each have some share in justice, or not be among human beings' 
(323b-c). So Protagoras, like Socrates, rejects the aristocratic notion that 
only certain families have a proper capacity for virtue. Differences in 
natural ability at all levels of society are what explains why children of 
prominent citizens often turn out useless or bad. But all normal humans 
are born with a natural capacity for justice, and everyone raised in 
civilisation develops at least some measure of it (327c-e). 
The legacy of the sophists on the teaching of virtue 
So we discard the old prejudice that sophists were all radical relativists or 
amoral opportunists. The best sophists were contributing much to early 
philosophy, and helped shape the ethical philosophies of Socrates , Plato 
and Aristotle . 
When Plato has Socrates praise Protagoras ' speech, it isn 't just sar-
casm; he doesn 't dispute any of its main points as they continue the debate. 
Apparently Socrates' famous 'techne-analogy,' comparing and contrasting 
virtues with the knowledge embodied in technical skills, was already 
practised by Protagoras (321d, 322b-d). Though Protagoras rejects Socra -
tes' particular brand of ethical intellectualism - that virtue is essentially 
knowledge, such that knowing what's right entails doing it - both of their 
approaches express the confidence in progress through reasoning that 
characterised the work of all the early sophists. 
The new kinds of theory in Plato's Republic go much beyond the 
reasonings of Socrates or any of the sophists. But there was an ancient 
rumour that most of Plato's Republic was already contained in a work by 
Protagoras (Diogenes Laertius IIl.37, 57). However that unlikely notion 
came about, Plato himself suggests Protagorean influence by incorporat-
ing the elementary education he had already attributed to Protagoras: 
organising the child's daily life as a constant lesson in virtue, moulding 
character through imitation, play and punishment, and the rhythms of 
good music and exercise. In Plato's thinking, these measures prepare 
youths for complete virtue by forming well-ordered minds that can recog-
nise the transcendent source of good order itself. 
When Aristotle rejects the transcendent orientation of Platonic higher 
education, he maintains the emp h asis on early habituation to good char-
acter. His masterfully detailed theory of virtues retains a roughly 
Protagorean shape: (1) we are born with a natural capacity for virtue-and 
for vice, though human nature and society really require the virtue; (2) 
virtues of character are instilled by practical training, involving imitation, 
punishments and rewards; (3) this training is completed through intellec-
tual teaching and stud y. Aristotle's intellectual virtue of'practical wisdom ' 
(phronesis) is much like Protagoras' 'good judgment' (euboulia) three 
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generations back: a general skill in public and private words and deeds, 
which is necessary for flourishing in a civilised society, and which com-
pletes the ordinary course of education in virtue. 
Notes 
1. panton chrematon metron estin anthropos, ton men onton hos estin, ton de ouk 
onton hos ouk estin. 'Man is the measure ' is the standard translation. I pref er 'the 
human being is the measure' , which better preserves an ambiguity in metron estin 
anthropos: does he mean each individual human , or humans collectively? 
2. Compare also Fragment 11: 'Education doesn't sprout in the soul if one 
doesn't go very deep.' 
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